The idea has recently taken root that evolutionary theory and social constructivism are less antagonistic than most theorists thought, and we have even seen attempts at integrating constructivist and evolutionary approaches to human thought and behaviour. We argue in this article that although the projected integration is possible, indeed valuable, the existing attempts have tended to be vague or overly simplistic about the claims of social constructivists. We proceed by examining how to give more precision and substance to the research programme of evolutionary social constructivism, a task we accomplish by focussing on the specific selection pressures that may have shaped the psychological and cultural mechanisms that give rise to social constructions. The benefit of such an integration for social constructivism is to have a solid foundation in the natural sciences. For evolutionists, evolutionary social constructivism offers a wider assortment of methods with which to study the interplay between culture and human nature.
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Paving the Way for an Evolutionary Social Constructivism
Did our sexual preferences and mating patterns evolve in the Pleistocene? Can one study present-day homosexuality without so much as a nod in the direction of the cultural changes that gave rise to the modern concept of homosexuality? Is the way we understand ourselves profoundly influenced by politics and ideology? Are mental disorders failures of naturally selected functions or are they created by apparatuses and techniques of power? Since the rise of the sociobiological approach in human behavioural sciences, social constructivists and Darwinians have been engaged in what seems to be a kind of turf war over these and similar questions. Social constructivists attack evolutionary psychologists because they see evolutionary psychology as a pseudoscientific cover for a plethora of reactionary attitudes like sexism, racism, and so on (compare Travis 2003) . Similarly, behavioural ecologists and evolutionary psychologists tend to be less than sympathetic to social constructivism, which they portray as a rubber ideology that lacks any and all scientific standards and that prides itself in its nonsensical vocabulary (Kruger 2002; Gross and Levitt 1994) .
As is often the case in many academic disputes, the parties involved are not all that well informed about the central tenets, to say nothings of the subtleties, of the adverse theory (Segerstråle 2000) . Consequently, it is hard to imagine how social constructivism or evolutionary psychology could ever profit from the arguments put forward by their opponents. Hacking notes, correctly, that "[P] ublic scientists shout at sociologists, who shout back. You almost forget that there are issues to discuss." (Hacking 1999: vii) Recently, however, some theoreticians -mostly from the Darwinian side -have taken up the role of appeaser or bridge builder (Mallon and Stich 2000; Plotkin 2002; compare also Dickins 2004; Shakespeare and Erickson 2000) . They argue that evolutionary approaches to human behaviour and social constructivism are not mutually exclusive, and that it might even be possible to integrate both fields into a new academic discipline, called "evolutionary social constructivism" (Wilson 2005) . Suggestive as the idea may be, existing proposals for this integration are still very much in need of correction and elaboration. What we would like to do here is give the research programme of evolutionary social constructivism (ESC) the necessary precision and substance, by considering ways in which evolution can explain why we socially construct things.
Obviously, our concern can be seen as part of the broader desire of integrating sociology and biology. In this debate, we do not defend a biological reductionism, but rather a genuine integration. Whereas biological reductionism would just correct naïve versions of social constructivism, ESC also aims at correcting naïve -and scientifically often dubious -evolutionary approaches to human behaviour. Such naïve evolutionary approaches are widespread, and certainly not limited to the field of evolutionary psychology. Even theorists like Plotkin have argued that social constructivism ultimately fails to understand the nature and origin of so-called "social constructions" (Plotkin 2002 
Introducing the Problem
Dobzhansky's dictum, that "nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution" (Dobzhansky 1973: 125) , reflects the synthetic potential of neo-Darwinian theory of evolution. Today, most biologists are convinced that evolutionary theory is crucial to the project of unifying all areas of biological research:
palaeontology, embryology, molecular biology, ecology, and genetics. (Cheah 1996; Bauman 1999) . Obviously, its anti-naturalism should not be identified with a commitment to miraculous interventions or, in
Dennett's words, divine skyhooks (Dennett 1995) . Social constructivists are only antinaturalistic in the sense that they reject the image of the human subject as a natural given. According to constructivists, humans are no natural creatures, but rather effects of cultural processes. In short, they seem to promote a Münchhausen-like account of culture, in which culture provides its own foundations. The words of Berger and Luckmann clearly illustrate the social constructivist bootstrapping of culture: "Man's selfproduction is always, and of necessity, a social enterprise. Men together produce a human environment, with the totality of its socio-cultural and psychological formations." (Berger and Luckmann 1971 [1966]: 69) 6 
The Many Kinds of Social Constructivism
According to Hacking, "[p] eople begin to argue that X is socially constructed when they find that in the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted; X appears to be inevitable." (Hacking 1999: 12) To this precondition, social constructivists usually add three elements: "(1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is, is not determined by the nature of things;
it is not inevitable. Very often they go further, and urge that: (2) X is quite bad as it is. (3) We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically transformed." (Hacking 1999: 6) Hacking's characterization is adequate, even if a little too broad and vague. Even though it has become the canonical definition of social constructivism, most social constructivists make much stronger claims than the ones mentioned by Hacking, whose account tends (quite visibly) to obscure the important epistemological pillar of social constructivism. Yes, social constructivism does offer ontological and ethical positions, but it is also -we may even say mainly -a method of analyzing people's thoughts and knowledge. Social constructivists believe that one must focus on "social epistemology" in order to elucidate how social constructions come into being (Brown et al. 1998 (Bunge 1996: 297) . However, social constructivism can also be more moderate.
There is in the social sciences a continuum of acceptance of social constructivist ideas, and social constructivist researchers from different disciplines vary in the distance along that continuum that they are prepared to travel (Burr 1998: 15 Anyone could extend this list a few pages without getting controversial. (Collier 1998: 39) This last position implies that social constructivism is not intrinsically opposed to certain evolutionary approaches to human psychology, though it is obvious that this compatibility need not lead to an integration of evolutionary psychology and social constructivism. It might also lead to the view that each cobbler has to stick to his last. Some evolutionary scholars, for instance, have defended the view that both disciplines are consistent and maybe even complementary (Mallon and Stich 2000) , but that they are not synergic because one discipline cannot be substantially enriched by the scientific findings of the other (Gintis 2004 ). What we would like to show is that it is not only possible, but desirable, to go beyond what is often called "vertical integration" (Barkow 2006 ).
The latter indeed seems to imply nothing more than one-way traffic, from evolutionary theory towards social constructivism that is. But in order to bring about a genuine, horizontal, that is synergic, integration of the two disciplines, we need real linking pins, allowing for interdisciplinary traffic in both directions. We believe a good starting point for finding these linking points consists of the evolved social abilities in which social processes such as essentialization and identity-formation are grounded.
Bridging the Gap
Social constructivism comes in different shapes and sizes, so that we must start by pinpointing which kind of social constructivism we are trying to connect with evolutionary theory.
Needless to say, the philosophical strand of social constructivism that makes it its business to undermine science as such can never be reconciled with evolutionary theory (or with any other scientific theory for that matter). specialized tools -a mirror image, as were, of a discussion endemic to the current variety of evolutionary approaches to human behaviour.
Wilson's argument is not free of problems. He is obviously right that it is easy to establish a middle-ground position between extreme nativism and extreme anti-nativism. Many evolutionary theorists, Wilson included, have contributed to our understanding of the interaction between culture and nature (Pulliam and Dunford 1980; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Cronk et al. 2000) . But the problem is that Wilson's description of social constructivism obscures some of the more specific social constructivist claims. It is in fact true that social constructivism emphasizes the flexibility of human nature and the variability of human thinking and behaviour, but is also true that the same emphasis can be found in many other psychological or sociological theories. Hence, if one wants to set social constructivism on an evolutionary foundation, one must not neglect to take into account its more specific claims.
iii A number of evolutionists believe that social constructions exist, though this does not keep them from being rather sceptical about the explanations for their existence offered by social constructivism (Plotkin 2002) . We want to show that this sceptical attitude is at least partially unwarranted, and that the mechanisms described and studied by social constructivism are objects susceptible of legitimate evolutionary explanations. In what follows, we will discuss four core elements of social constructivism we have encountered earlier, and suggest how they may be incorporated into evolutionary thinking. These elements should not be seen as part of a monolithic interpretation of "social constructivism". But since they are present in nearly every variety of psychological social constructivism, ranging from the extreme social constructivism of Gergen (1985) to Hacking's moderate version of it, an integration or reconciliation of these four elements with evolutionary theory is necessary to establish a viable ESC. We will address each of our social constructivist core elements using the following structure. 
Essentializing Reason
Social constructivists argue that social constructions arise when the continuous flow of contingencies is stabilized through generalizations and concepts. These concepts, moreover, tend to become reified: people start to think that these abstract concepts have real and tangible existence. The concept of "mental illness" is a good example. Hacking has shown convincingly how "fugue" (Hacking 1998 ) and "multiple personality disorder" (Hacking 1995) are cultural artefacts ("social constructions"), since they are not bounded entities with fixed properties, and they are not indifferent to changing conventions in psychiatric diagnostics. They are not natural kinds, in other words, even though most people, including many psychiatrists and their patients, once considered "fugue" and "multiple personality disorder" to be natural kinds.
How do these social constructivist approaches to "mental illness" compare with their evolutionary counterparts? For one thing, it is true that successful social constructivist approaches to mental disorders can be fatal for (certain) Darwinian accounts of mental disorders (Adriaens 2007 (Atran 1990 ). The essentialization of social constructs or other cultural artefacts may result from an overextension of this adaptive system. In Atran's view, essentialism is a domain-specific mode of thinking, part of our "natural history module". But the fact that this module is far from being fully encapsulated means that it allows for many misfires. Hirschfeld has argued that this position runs aground on the fact that the essentialist thinking associated with biological taxa differs quite substantially from the kind of essentialist thinking applied to, e.g., race and ethnicity (Hirschfeld 1996 
Dominance and Subordination
Like many disciplines in the social sciences, social constructivism focuses its analyses on how power relations influence human behaviour. What is distinctive to social constructivism is the belief that these power relations are not (only) the outcome of a struggle between fully aware subjects striving for power, but they result predominantly from social practices and from the language used by these social practices. Essentialist social constructions of the kind discussed above are indeed often regarded as a function of processes associated with dominance and subordination. The so-called "birth of the addict" illustrates the social constructivist point.
Social constructivists argue that "addiction" is best understood not as an independent medical or scientific discovery, but as part of a transformation in social thought which corresponds with fundamental changes in societal structure. These fundamental changes led to the assumption that all social problems were solvable or curable (Goffman 1968) : from then on, all deviant behaviour was treated as an abnormality. Individuals who might otherwise have led full, but perturbed, lives were from all of a sudden subjected to a form of private exclusion and bureaucratic interference which transformed what was once seen as somewhat eccentric behaviour into something that called for treatment, maybe even institutionalization (Foucault 2003 (Foucault [1963 ). Strangely enough, the people subjected to this did not seem bothered about it themselves. Their ready acceptance of their subordinated position only aggravated their situation (Russell 2002 
Narratives and Identities
The overwhelming importance of language returns -and with a vengeance at that -in the emphasis on narratives: social constructivists are fond of pointing out whenever they can that that the construction of reality takes on a narrative form (Bruner 1991) .
Social constructivists argue, persuasively, that narratives are a pervasive feature of the reality of everyday life which shape not only our modes of thought but also, and perhaps more importantly, reality itself, giving meaning and a sense of coherence to it (Baudrillard 1996) . In discussing what they call the "politics of narrative", Hinchman and Hinchman note that "[p]eople tell stories because they need to know who they are and how to behave in a world that is complex and often dangerous" (Hinchman and Hinchman 1997: xxviii) . Social constructivists nonetheless often focus their analyses on the dysfunctional effects of narratives on individuals of our species. If humans use stories for their own benefit, it seems no less true that stories may use humans.
Besides stressing the importance of narratives for structuring the world surrounding us, social constructivists also see narratives as playing a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of social and personal identities (Nelson 2003; Gergen and Gergen 1983; Singer 2004; Harré 2002; Callero 2003; Giddens 1984) . Groups and individuals alike employ stories to invest themselves (and others) with a sense of integrity.
More so than is the case for the other social constructivist core elements, the core element of narratives and identities has already gained some foothold in evolutionary theorizing about human behaviour. Darwinian scholars, however, are in general more interested in accounting for the human story-telling capacity as such, and for the recurrent features of the resulting narratives.
They also tend to emphasize stable dispositional personality traits over and above narrative features of identities.
According to Scalise Sugiyama, for example, the fact that there is what she calls a "thematic universality" to narratives "lends support to the hypothesis that storytelling originally emerged as a means of storing and transmitting certain types of fitness-related information" (Scalise Sugiyama 2001: 242) . Other evolutionary accounts of the origin of narrative focus more on the relation between narratives and literature as a form of art in general (Carroll 2004; Wilson 1998 constructivists are on the right track when they assume that stories are more or less trustworthy guides in a dangerous world.
Even if the emphasis on the autonomous power of stories that can be found in social constructivism may clash with evolutionary theories about the origins of story-telling, scholars who regard themselves as adaptationists would be the first to acknowledge that once the capacity to narrate is in place, the spread of stories need not necessarily entail a match between the (groups of) organisms that somehow propagate them, and the environments in which they live.
Memetics enthusiasts like Dennett (1995) are quite fond of stressing the virus-like qualities of catchy stories, which tend to infect their hosts in a non-adaptive fashion.
As to the matter of identities, there is no doubt that evolutionary psychologists and (human) behavioural ecologists alike might quibble with social constructivists -and with good reason -about the extent to which certain personality traits are hard-wired adaptive results of natural and sexual selection (Buss 1991; Dall et al. 2004; Nettle 2006; compare also MacDonald 1998) . 
Theory-ladenness of Observation
Finally, social constructivists believe that language and the narratives it makes possible shape our knowledge of the world. Our observations are said to be at least partially influenced by the concepts and stories that our society has adopted (Hanson 1958; Quine 1960; Kuhn 1970; Berger and Luckmann 1971 [1966] ). Different conceptual or theoretical backgrounds give rise to qualitatively different perceptions. Social constructivism never misses a chance to emphasize just how theory-laden our observations are, and how this fact undermines, in their view, the objectivity of science (Latour and Woolgar 1979) . Scientists belong to a field staffed predominantly by other males and funded by the wheels of capitalist society, and so their views are profoundly affected by sexism and capitalism. Current science is just the continuation of politics by other means. This is (supposedly) reflected in the scientists' choice of subjects and in the outcomes of their studies.
Evolutionary psychology, for instance, focuses excessively on sex differences and cheating, and finds that men are primarily attracted by women with a 0,7 waist-hip ratio. They (often) bring to their work the cultural values of their sex, race, and class (Haraway 1989) , thus carrying on a tradition that was started by Darwin himself, as Michael Ruse has noted: "Not only do we learn
[from The Descent of Men] that men are strong and brave and brainy, whereas women are kind and gentle and sensitive; that whites are intelligent and hard working whereas blacks are stupid and lazy; but that, on the whole, capitalism is not a bad thing." (Ruse 1999: 70) Unfortunately, it would appear to be the case that the social constructivist core element of the theory-ladenness of observation would even be particularly damning for evolutionary theory. However, the issue at stake here is not only how evolutionary psychologists and other Darwinian scientists can avoid the pitfalls of doing ideologically driven (pseudo-)science, but also why human observations are in general theory-laden.
Some evolutionary psychologists think that this is simply a bad (Carruthers 2006) . Likewise, the proposals put forward by Mithen (1996) and Sperber (1996) seem to go at least some way in blurring the dividing line between cognition and perception, thus allowing the distinction between theory and observation to be relaxed, in much the same way as more moderate social constructivists envisage it.
Both stronger and weaker evolutionary takes on modularity can profit from taking seriously the more moderate social constructivist approaches to the theory-ladenness of observation, scientific or otherwise. For instance, research into these modules could thus shed light on how exactly the innate theory-ladenness of observation affects scientific theorizing (see, e.g., De Cruz and De Smedt 2007) . Conversely, if cognitive fluidity appears to lie at the origin of science, as Mithen (1996) claims, this undoubtedly helps to explain why it is not immune to knowledge acquired through social transmission.
Discussion and Conclusion
It may be unfortunate for some that not everyone "reading Evolutionary Psychology is above taking social constructionism and environmentalism seriously" (Kanazawa 2006: 103 privilege the identification of differences across the laws they compare" (Legrand 2001 (Legrand : 1049 . Better still, "in the quest for thick or deep understanding, the comparatist must maintain alterity in its specificity while at all times avoiding the tendency to essentialize it" (Legrand 2003: 297 (Lieberman et al. 2003) . However, there are at least three reasons why this valuable evolutionary approach would benefit from ESC. First, many evolutionary authors mix up incest and inbreeding (Spain 1987) , thereby leaving out the likely exploitation of a biological outbreeding avoidance by cultural kin terms (Cronk 1999) . Social constructivists expose this omission, by emphasizing that meaning matters and that the meaning of cultural terms such as "incest" or "family" often influence human behavior. Or as Berger and Luckmann put it: "the incest taboo itself is nothing but the negative side of an assemblage of typifications, which define in the first place which sexual conduct is incestuous and which is not." (Berger and Luckmann 1971 [1966] : 73). ESC would only add to this "pure" social constructivist claim that the direction, in which the meaning of cultural terms steers human behavior, makes evolutionary sense. Secondly, the "natural" and adaptive character of sexual aversion towards close relatives, does not exclude the possibility that a law that strictly forbids incestuous relationships can -at least slightly -transform our attitude towards incest. Such a law may have effects on the emotions experienced by victims and wrong-doers. And if the law is seen as sacred (a "taboo"), one can expect that it will perhaps affect the desires of the individuals subjected to it, for instance because incest is presented as a privilege of the gods or the nobility (Serrano and Gunzburger 1983) . Incest is then no longer simply disgusting, but can also become a forbidden and fascinating fruit.
This transformation is not irreconcilable with evolutionary theory, nor is it just a complement of it: it is exactly what one would expect, given the -on average -adaptive character of a prestige bias and of our evolved tendency to rely on stories as guides for our own behaviour. Thirdly, the categories "incest victim" and "sexual abuser" are often treated as natural kinds, with more or less stable category membership. Yet, historical and socialconstructivist research has revealed that the essence ascribed to the "incest victim" and the "abusing father" depends to a large extent on socio-political circumstances and psychiatric practices (Guarnieri 1998; Hacking 1995 To conclude, our central claim is that incorporating social constructivist elements into evolutionary approaches to human thought and behaviour has important benefits for both parties.
Social constructivism derives from it the benefit of a solid foundation in the natural sciences. Social constructivist ideas which had previously been regarded as problematic, may gain legitimacy when viewed from an evolutionary perspective. For evolutionists, ESC offers a wider assortment of methods to study the interplay between culture and human nature. ESC is likely to be an indispensable building block for actually realizing the synthetic potential the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution has to offer to the social sciences.
i Obviously, there are differences between (various brands of) evolutionary psychology and human behavioural ecology in this and other respects. We have chosen, here and in other parts of this paper, not to give detailed accounts of these -mostly surmountable -differences. But see, e.g., Smith 2000, Laland and Brown 2002 . We are, likewise, well aware of the fact that we have not included each and every evolutionary and social constructivist approach relevant to the issues we deal with.
ii Many social constructivists of the anti-realist kind, refer to Bruno Latour as their intellectual godfather. Latour himself however, distanced himself from his admirers' effort to dismantle the natural sciences: "The mistake would be to believe that we too have given a social explanation of scientific facts. No, even though it is true that at first we tried, like good critics trained in the good schools, to use the armaments handed to us by our betters and elders to crack open -one of their favourite expressions, meaning to destroy -religion, power, discourse, hegemony. But, fortunately (yes, fortunately!), one after the other, we witnessed that the black boxes of science remained closed and that it was rather the tools that lay in the dust of our workshop, disjointed and broken. Put simply, critique was useless against objects of some solidity." (Latour 2004, 242) iii Mallon and Stich admit that their paper on the reconciliation of evolutionary psychology and social constructivism is in fact first and foremost about the reconciliation of evolutionary psychology and the SSSM: "all SSSM advocates are social constructionists in our sense". (Mallon and Stich 2000: 134) iv Alternatively, it could be argued that, while it generally promotes social dominance, a personality trait like extraversion also entails sensation seeking (Nettle 2005 (Nettle , 2006 , which can possibly lead to addictive behaviour.
v In the scientific literature, "social constructivism" and "social constructionism" are often used as synonyms.
vi Berger and Luckmann continue with the following: "The deviant conceptions are not merely assigned a negative status, they are grappled with theoretically in detail. The final goal of this procedure is to incorporate the deviant conceptions within one's own universe, and thereby to liquidate them ultimately.
The deviant conceptions must, therefore, be translated into concepts derived from one's own universe. In this manner, the negation of one's universe is subtly changed into an affirmation of it. The presupposition is always that the negator does not really know what he is saying. His statements become meaningful only as they are translated into more 'correct' terms, that is, terms deriving from the universe he negates". (Berger and Luckmann 1971 [1966] , 133)
